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TERRORISM 
I. The Problem 
Terrorist tactics are not new in human history. Man's 
oldest written records reveal instances of terrorism often 
involving political motives. For example, the English word 
assassin is derived from a word given to Old French by the 
Crusaders when they were terrorized by a Muslim sect originally 
called the hashashin or hashshashin because of their use of 
hashish, a refined form of marihuana. This sect used a golden 
dagger to destroy not only the Christian foreigners, but also 
sultans, caliphs, princes, generals and mosque officials who 
opposed the Ismailian Muslims. 
What is of primary interest, of course, is not the ancient 
roots of man's propensity to terrorize~ but the current wave of 
terror being experienced on a worldwide basis. To begin a 
cataloging of the locations of terrorist activities in the late 
1960's and early 1970's is to begin a very long and diverse 
list. Perhaps it would be better to examine our definition of 
terrorism. In a general sense, terrorism is the use of violence 
to intimidate or subjugate another or others. In this sense 
it includes a host of activities aimed primarily at gaining 
personal advantage--what might be called personal terrorism--e.g., 
extortion, kidnapping, etc. This, however, is not the type of 
terrorism which has seen such dramatic increase. This discussion 
will focus upon political terrorism, i.e., those terrorist acts 
involving political· personalities or an underlying political 
motivation. 
Terrorism in America 
Most Ainericans were shocked into an awareness of political 
terrorism on November 23, 1963, with the assassination of John 
F. Kennedy. Since that time a continuing series of political 
terrorist acts, both at home and abroad, have kept that aware-
ness alive. Yet there is a very real sense in which Americans 
should not have been surprised at this type of violence. H. Rap 
Brown, a black militant leader, has reportedly observed that 
such violence is "as American as cherry pie." Although most 
citizens would probably be offended by such a statement, a 
report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention 
of Violence by its task force on assassination and political 
violence has pointed to the same reality in less polemical 
language: 
During all stages of our Nation's history, 
violence has been one response offered to many 
of ~he controversial issues confronting our 
soc1ety. The establishment of independence, 
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the relationship of settlers with the American 
Indian, the slavery and secession questions, and 
the trade union and civil rights movements are 
prime examples. Included in this history of 
violence are deadly attacks on persons holding 
public office. 1 
The report lists 81 political assassinations and attempted 
assassinations of American political figures beginning in 
1835 ti1 an attempt on the life of President Andrew Jackson~­
The report goes on to observe: 
The United States, of course, was born in 
political violence •... 
The prototype of political violence in the 
United States is the vigilante committee--an 
extra-legal group that enforces the values of 
the community by illegal violence. Vigilantism 
is a phenomenon apparently unique to the United 
States. 2 
Such vigilantism has even received the approbation of high 
government officials at times. For example, Andrew Jackson 
approved of the vigilante methods involved in the trial and 
execution of Patrick O'Conner in Dubuque's earl~ minirtg days. 3 
Although this occurred at a time when clarifica'tion of Iowa's 
territorial Eltatus was pending, the vigilante phenomenon has 
often continued in the United States even after the institutions 
of legitimate authority were firmly established in a particular 
area. 
An examination of the last 150 years of American history 
presents evidence that political violence tends to peak at 
times of social change and turmoil. The task force report 
relates the present period of political violence to those 
episodes in our past: 
the United States has in the past experienced 
high levels of violence comparable in intensity 
to the present day. The country does no~ appear 
to be passing through a period of unique internal 
political violence ... past violence has been 
. associated with specific issues, such as agrarian 
1J'ames F. Kirham, Sheldon G. Levy, and Wil'liam J. Crotty, 
Assassination and Political Violence: A Report to the National 
O::>mmission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. VIII 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Off1ce, 1969), p. 9. 
2Ibid., p. 172. 
3Eliphalet Price, "The T'rial and Execution of Patrick 
O'Conner at the Dubuque Mines in the Suimrier of 18.34," Palimpset, 
I (Sept. 1920), pp. 86-97. . 
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reform, abolitionism, reconstruction, and labor 
violence. The turmoil of the 1960's shows up, 
however, as a peak at least comparable to the 
high points of violence in the nation's past. 
Relative to the impact of this violence upon the 
public, the intensity of violence in the 1960's 
has probably not been duplicated since the turn 
of the century, or at least since the late 1920's. 
Thus, most persons today have not experienced a 
comparably violent period of American history.4 
It should be noted that the present period of violence has 
also had added impact because of increased media coverage, 
because of the dramatic nature of the particular events of 
recent political violence and because of the concomitant rise 
of political violence at the international level. 
International Terrorism 
What is of most striking concern, not only to Americans 
but also to many persons around the world, is the very evident 
increase in premeditated, organized political terrorism. For 
Americans this is a new experience. As the report on assassina-
tion and political violence points out: 
Truly "political" assassination, that is 
assassinations that are part of a rational 
scheme to transfer political power from one 
group to another or to achieve specific policy 
objectives are rare in the United States. 5 
Yet this is exactly the sort of political terrorism which the 
international community must begin to face in such groups as 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine, the Arab Black September movement, 
the Tupamaros (who are urban guerrillas in Latin America), and 
the various liberation movements in southern Africa. 
For most people political terrorism on an international 
level is associated with the Palestinian Arab guerilla 
organizations. This is logical since most of the recent, 
dramatic terrorist events have had their origins with these 
groups. Early in the 1970's they created such incidents as 
the following: 
SEPTEMBER, 1970 -- Three airliners (one British, one 
American, one Swiss) carrying over 400 persons were 
simultaneously skyjacked by members of the Popular 
4Ibid., pp. 181-182. 
5Ibid .. , p. xvii. 
- 3 -
FEBRUARY, 
mil 
the 
MAY, 1972 
SEPTEMBER, 1972 
the 
Olympic game 
terrorists 
shot .. 
A 
The planes 
Jordan and the 
several days. 
was to gain release of 
attacks involving planes. 
persons 
troyed, but all 
involving the Black 
t, breakaway 
faction with the 
the Arab Commando 
Wasfi Tal of 
was skyjacked for $5 
Popular Front for 
over an 
they 
by the 
The plane 
and one 
and eighty 
Aviv. T~e killings 
ts trained 
Liberation of Palestine. 
There was some 
was meant 
Moshe Dayan 
September assaulted 
at the Munich 
lled.. Five 
were also 
period three 
were mounted. One 
, one at tinian 
tish businessmen 
took over the 
, while a 
After holding 
and demanding the 
the world, 
Belgian) vvere 
captured. 
While it is certainly true that Arab terrorists are the 
most active and dramatic, they are by no means the only group 
involved. The Tupamaros originated seven kidnapin.gs or 
kidnaping attempts in Latin America during the early months of 
1970. Two diplomats, one American and one West German, were 
killed. The Irish Republican Army has recently extended its 
bombings beyond Northern Ireland. Several recent assassinations 
in Bermuda are rumored to be of an attempt by criminals 
dealing in drugs to gain a base of operations near the United 
States. And within the United States there is growing concern 
about such groups as "De Mau Mau, 11 named after the black 
terrorist movement in Kenya in the 1950's. So far there has 
been a minimum of evidence for highly organized terrorist 
activities in the United States, but a growing number of 
isolated incidents--sniping at police and firemen, arson, 
bombings, property destruction, discovery of bomb factories, and 
so forth-~have created the fear that only an overlaying net of 
organization is needed to bring forth a frightening potential. 
Vulnerability to Terrorists 
Modern society is extremely vulnerable to these terrorist 
activitie~. One reason why international terrorism has been 
able to succeed as well as it has is because of the permeability 
of national boundaries. As the London Economist has pointed 
out in the context of discussing the threat posed by letter-
bombs: 
The trouble is that a lot of the convenience of 
civilized modern life consists in having things 
provided over a distance instead of having to 
go out and get them yourself: not only communi-
cations with your friends, but food and goods 
and information of all kinds--even your daily 
milk and water. Every one of these acts of 
transmission is a chance for the terrorist to 
get his hand in. That is why modern society 
is wide open to the fanatics with bombs or 
poisons--maybe one day with germs and atomic 
devices .. 6 
Even within a given set of national boundaries, complex 
modern transportation, distribution and communication systems 
create points of extreme vulnerability. For example, the 
water supply, electrical power supply, or telephone network 
for most large cities could be crippled by a few strategically 
targeted acts of sabotage. The result could be to create a 
temporary level of chaos, making it all but impossible to 
live or work in the urban complex. 
6
"Under Skull and Crossbones," Economist, CCXLV (Nov. 18, 
1972) 1 p,. 11. 
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Th~ three ts involved in the 
massacre of Israeli athletes at the Olympics in 
Munich, West Germany, t year were released to 
Tripoli by West Germany and were given a hero's 
welcome and freed.9 
In the la~e 1960's and 1970's there was considerable discussion 
of Cuba's "exporting" revolution to the rest of Latin America. 
Robert Moss has summari that situation as follows: 
Broadly speaking, have been two waves of 
guerrilla movements Latin America since 1959 [the 
year Castro took over Cuba]. The first wave, 
incited by Cuban propaganda and sometimes assisted 
by more concrete forms of Cuban aid, consisted 
of the plagiarists. They failed, partly because 
they tended to believe uncritically that any 
Latin American regime would prove as brittle 
as Batista's and that any range of hills would 
provide a safe harbour and the springboard for 
revolution that Castro found in the Sierra 
Maestra. Guevara's il fated expedition in Bolivia 
in 1967 was almost a parody of this approach. 
After the plagiarists came the improvisers. Since 
1967, the middle-class rebels who took to the hills 
with copies of Guevara's Reminiscences of the Cuban 
Revolu.tionary War or Debray' s Revolu·tion in the 
Revolution? in their rucksacks have crept back 
to the cities they came from to wage the war of 
the urban guerrilla.lO 
This activity of Cuban-formed revolutionaries brings up the 
additional of organizational links among international 
terrorists~ There are increasing indications that a sort of 
cross-pollination may be taking place among terrorists. The 
Palestinian training camps may be not only a proving ground for 
those interested in regaining lands lost to Israel, but they 
also may be a training site for revolutionaries from all over 
the world. The three Japanese terrorists involved in the 
massacre at the Tel Aviv airport are a case in point. Bryan 
Crozier, director of London's Institute for the Study of Con-
flict gives the following description of their involvement. 
That chain of events illustrates again the 
transnational nature of present day terrorism. 
Nine members of the Japanese group hijacked an 
9"'Choice for Sudan: U.S .. , Arab Wrath," Des Moines 
Register, March 6, 1973, p. 5. 
IORobert Moss, The War for the Cities (New York: Coward, 
McCann and Geoghegan, 1972), p. 141. 
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There are, at least, two crucial tests in 
deciding what should be acceptable to the inter-
national community. First, do the conditions that 
exist in any particular country offer any change 
of redressing serious wrongs by other than violent 
means? Second, does a movement which embraces 
the need for violent opposition deliberately 
encourage indiscriminate killing or harming of 
innocent people? 
Clearly no constitutional means exist for peace-
ful change in countries such as; South Africa, 
Namib , Rhodesia, the Portugue:Se [African] 
colonies, or in Communist countries .... 
But who are the innocents? This is a question 
that goes to the root of much of the present 
controversy .... 
The PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine] ... defended their indiscriminate shooting 
of passengers at Lod Airport by claiming that all 
visitors to Israel are accomplices of "the 
Zionists." ..... The anti-Portuguese guerrilla move-
ments •.. now conscientiously insist on treating all 
Portuguese not actively engaged in military or 
official positions as themselves victims of their 
own oppressive regime. 
These clear-cut differences of attitude suggest 
a line that can be drawn between what is legiti-
mate and what is not: groups that try to justify 
indiscriminate violence by insisting that entire 
national groups or communities are equally guilty 
should be regarded as putting themselves beyond 
what is acceptable in international law. 13 
Clearly terrorism is a problem, and a frightening one. What 
is not so clear is how to go about controlling terrorism. This 
is the question with which the next section will deal. 
13colin Legum, "The Rise of Terrorism: How to Curb 
International ~errorism?" Current, January, 1973, ppe 7-8. 
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3. We have noted that the blending of rational and pathological 
personalities within terrorist movements can have a compli-
cating effect on any attempt to deal with terrorists. Is 
this one reason for the policy of some governments to make 
no attempt to deal with terrorists? What other reasons might 
there be for such a policy? Discuss the wisdom of such a 
policy. 
4. Colin Legum has suggested two basic guidelines for containing 
terrorism within limits that the international conununity 
might find acceptable. They are that terrorism might be 
justified when the constitutional structure of the nation 
involved leaves no alternative other than violence for the 
redressing of serious wrongs; and that terrorist tactics 
are justified when they make a sufficiently clear distinction 
between those persons actively involved in perpetrating the 
serious wrong and those persons who only passively accept 
the status quo. Discuss the implications of such guidelines. 
Would you find terrorism within these guidelines acceptable 
and justified assuming you felt the terrorists' basic cause 
was justified? Why? Why not? 
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TERRORISM 
II. The Question of Control 
In the first section we have seen the evidence of the rapid 
rise in the number of politically motivated terrorist incidents. 
We have also examined the vulnerable nature of a complex 
society. This vulnerability is even greater for a society 
which strives to give a measure of personal freedom to its 
citizens. Democratic governments face a particular dilemma 
which causes them to be more cautious about the sorts of control 
measures they adopt. Some control measures which can lessen the 
threat of terrorism also can infringe substantially upon the 
personal freedom of those who are affected by the controls. 
A very common example of this is occurring daily in every 
major airport in the United States. The fourth article of the 
Bill of Rights reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and, no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Yet, despite this constitutional guarantee, virtually every 
passenger boarding a commercial airline flight in this country 
has his person and effects searched without warrant, without 
probable cause, and without specification of the particulars of 
the search. Even though very few airline passengers want to 
find themselves in the air with a bomb on board, or on a flight 
diverted at gunpoint to some distant destination, the search 
practice has already been challenged in the courts. The case 
grows out of the search of a passenger in California. Although 
the search was not for drugs, this particular passenger was found 
to be in possession of marihuana for which he was then arrested. 
A Los Angeles federal district court judge subsequently ruled 
that passengers may not be routinely searched. However, the 
case is under appeal and the practice continues. 
Thus, the problems of control are thorny ones. While it is 
probable that there is no complete answer to controlling acts of 
terrorism, political or personal, we shall review the steps which 
have been taken and proposed both by the United States government 
and by the international community. 
Skyjacking 
In the discussion of controls it will be useful to consider 
skyjacking separately from other terrorist incidents. Skyjacking 
is, by its nature, a more focused and centralized activity, and 
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negotiated through the efforts of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO), a United Nations sponsored group. 
They are the Tokyo Convention (1963), The Hague Convention (1970), 
and the Montreal Convention (1971). The first of these provides 
that all nations signing will immediately release passengers, 
crews and aircraft which have come under their jurisdiction 
while part of a skyjacking. It also affirms that the country 
in which an airplane is registered has jurisdiction over offenses 
committed on board during flight. The Hague Convention aims 
primarily at the apprehension and prosecution, or extradition, 
of hijackers. In addition, signator states agree to make 
skyjacking an offense punishable by severe penalties. Finally, 
the Montreal Convention extends The Hague Convention to acts other 
than skyjacking, such as attacks against the lives of persons on 
board an aircraft in flight, sabotage, bombing, or any intentional 
act that seriously damages or endangers an aircraft in flight. 
The United States has signed and ratified all three of these 
conventions .. 
The usefulness of the conventions is limited, however, by 
the fact that those countries likely to give support and 
sanctuary to a skyjacker have not become party to the agree-
ments. The International Federation of Air Line Pilots' 
Associations, among others, has urged sanctions against countries 
which do not comply with the conventions. Such sanctions could 
include the suspension of commercial air service.. The Federa-
tion backed its demands with a one-day strike, June 19, 1972. 
Besides these three multilateral treaties, the United 
States signed a bilateral treaty with Cuba on February 15, 1973 
covering the hijacking of both aircraft and ships. The bilateral 
treaty was necessary since Cuba is not a party to any of the ICAO 
conventions. In addition, the frequency of hijackings between 
the United States and Cuba as well as the lack of diplomatic 
relations had aggravated the problem. The agreement provides 
for the prompt return of the hijacked plane or ship with its 
passengers, crew, and all cargo. This would include any ransom 
which might have been extorted as a part of the hijacking. It 
also provides for the punishment of the offenders by the most 
severe penalty. 
Other Terrorist Acts 
As mentioned earlier, terrorist acts other than skyjacking 
are generally harder to control. In regard to such acts, however, 
the United States government has pursued the following lines 
of approach. First, it has urged that the international convention 
on the protection of diplomats be swiftly adopted. This agree-
ment would require the prosecution, or extradition, of those 
involved in crimes against diplomatic personnel. Second, the 
United States has proposed an additional convention to deter 
and punish other acts of international terrorism. Third, the 
United States has sought to use Interpol, the international 
law-enforcement agency, as a vehicle for increased police 
cooperation, especially in terms of information exchange, 
- 15 -
The major 
however, was 
General As 
over 
endorsed 
setting 
"colonial 
legitimate 
other human 
Relative to 
observed: 
on the 
ln 
{Janua:ry, 1973), p 
2 Colin Legum, " 
national 
16 
on 
The 
problem. 
that for 
with 
terrorism 
Curb Inter-
-8 e 
The whole issue of international terrorism had been intro-
duced into the U.N. agenda by Secretary General Kurt Waldheim 
following the attack on Israeli athletes during the Munich 
Olympics two months earlier. On the eve of the debate the 
U.N. Secretariat released a 40-page study of the need for 
international cooperation in order to curb terrorism in 
which it tried to separate the two issues of terrorist acts and 
the causes of such acts. · 
At times in history mankind has recognized 
the unavoidable necessity of repressing some forms 
of violence which otherwise could threaten the 
very existence of society as well as that of man 
himself .. 
There are some means of using force, as in every 
form of human conflict, which must not be used, 
even when the use of force is legally and morally 
justified, and regardless of the status of the 
perpetrator ...... 
The legitimacy of a cause does not, in itself, 
legitimize the use of certain forms of violence, 
especially against the innocent. This has long 
been recognized even in the customary law of 
war .. 3 
On the first day of debate Carl Lidbom of Sweden also tried to 
separate the issues when he observed, "We should not refrain 
from combatting terrorism while we wait for solutions to be 
found to the problems which are the causes of terrorism." 4 
However, in the end such separation was not achieved. 
In fairness to those who have urged that any treatment 
of the issue of terrorism must also include a treatment of its 
causes, there is a great deal of reasonableness in such an 
approach. Anything less would treat the symptoms and not the 
disease. As Colin Legum has pointed out: 
It would be wrong to suppose that it is possible 
to act effectively against all forms of terrorism 
without changing the fundamental causes which 
have produced a climate of extreme violence 
in certain societies: nothing, for example, can 
put an end to the terrorist elements among the 
Palestinians more quickly than a just peace in 
the Middle East .... 
Wherever people are left to rot in despair, 
we can be sure that their conditions will make 
them amenable to inhuman acts of violence at the 
3"Secretariat Study Supports Action on Terrorism by U.N. 
General Assembly," New York Times, November 9, 1972, p. 11. 
4
"Terrorism Issue Taken up at U.N." New York Times, 
November 10, 1972, p. 7. 
- 17 -
point 
to s 
terrorism 
5 Legum, " 
6 
"Cuban 
November 15, 
7 
December 17, 
thems 
of 
4, 
Committee 
The 
highly 
the United 
early 
on the 
and African 
issue off of 
to 
During 
Law 
an 
committee 
'absurd' to 
while the 
accepted. '" 6 
recently 
turned to 
constitute 
Times, 
The major thrust of the resolution, however, was to appoint a 
35-member committee with equitable geographical representation 
to study the observa~ions and conciete proposals of the various 
member states on this sensitive issue. The committee is further 
instructed to submit a report with recommendations for possible 
cooperation that can help in the speedy elimination of the 
problem. 
As the debate on the issue closed there was some indication 
that the Western powers, who had not secured the sort of strong 
positive action against terrorist for which they had worked, 
would push ahead outside of the U.N. framework to draft and 
implement an international treaty on the prosecution and 
extradition of terrorists. 
Thus, this difficult issue remains unresolved for the very 
reasons which became evident in the U.N. debate. There are 
certain causes which many of the world's countries apparently 
feel justify terrorist activities. For the particular 
terrorists whose motives are favored, some measure of support 
and protection will be available from these nations. As long 
as this is the case, it can be expected that terrorism will 
continue to be a problem with which the world must cope. 
However, it is possible that a coordinated stand taken by those 
countries which are opposed to terrorist tactics in the name 
of any cause may be able to give some measure of control over 
such activities. 
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4. Discuss the United Nations action relative to terrorism. 
Should the issue of the control of terrorism have been 
separated from the issue of the causes of terrorism? Or 
is it futile to discuss control without discussing the 
underlying causes? What are the reasons for your choice? 
To what extent is there a need to consider and find 
sanctions and controls for governmental terrorism? 
Which problem is more pressing, the one of government-
sponsored terrorist acts or the one of privately-sponsored 
terrorist acts? What are the reasons for your choice? 
Three courses of action were proposed during the U.N.'s 
debate: 1) a special international meeting to draw up an 
international agreement on the problem, 2) continuing 
study of the problem by a special commission of world-wide 
representation, or 3) assigning the task of drawing up an 
international agreement to an existing U.N. agency and 
giving that task "top priority." Which alternative do you 
favor and why? 
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